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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Lloyd Hardin McNeil appeals from the district court’s denial of his Rule 60(b)(6) motion
for relief from the district court’s order and judgment dismissing post-conviction relief.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In 2011, McNeil “was charged with second degree murder, first degree arson, and grand
theft.” State v. McNeil, 155 Idaho 392, 395, 313 P.3d 48, 51 (Ct. App. 2013). The Court of
Appeals described the underlying facts as follows:
On March 5, 2011, firefighters responded to a residential fire in a Boise
neighborhood. The firefighters determined that the fire was confined to a mattress
and box spring located in a bedroom. After removing the mattress from the house,
firefighters found the body of Natalie Davis lying on top of the box spring.
Following an investigation, firefighters concluded that the fire was intentional and
human caused. This conclusion was supported by subsequent reconstructed tests of
the scenario.
Pursuant to an investigation, police officers discovered that Davis’ car was missing,
along with her two dogs. Later, the dogs were located in a “no kill” shelter in Dillon,
Montana and McNeil was identified as the individual who dropped the dogs off.
Thereafter, McNeil was located in Seattle, Washington and arrested on a fugitive
warrant.
McNeil was charged with second degree murder, first degree arson, and grand theft.
Following a jury trial, he was acquitted of second degree murder and convicted of
the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. He was also convicted of
first degree arson and grand theft.
Id.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction on direct appeal. Id. at 403,
313 P.3d at 59.
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McNeil filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. (45766 R., pp.7-31.) 1 Counsel
was appointed to represent McNeil, and subsequently filed, among other things, an amended
petition (45766 R., pp.77-86), followed by a second amended petition for post-conviction relief
(45766 R., pp.169-87). The district court summarily dismissed the second amended petition.
(45766 R., pp.379-84.) McNeil timely appealed. (45766 R., pp.385-87.)
While McNeil’s post-conviction appeal was pending, he filed a series of pro se motions
with the state district court. (See R., pp.5-6.) These included his February, 2019 Rule 60(b) motion
for relief from the post-conviction judgment. (R, pp.9-12.) The motion alleged that postconviction counsel “fail[ed] to investigate the trial record, initiate discovery, and set down the
facts,” and that this, “together with an ignorance of relevant case law, put McNeil in a place absent
any meaningful representation, and established a post-conviction record devoid of pleadings or
filings sufficient to address the merits of constitutional violations in McNeil’s underlying criminal
conviction.”

(R., p.11.)

Specifically, McNeil contended that “post-conviction counsel

disregarded, or otherwise neglected to consult on,” 12 claims of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. (R, pp.14-15.)
In October of 2019, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the summary dismissal of
McNeil’s second amended post-conviction petition. McNeil v. State, No. 45766, 2019 WL
4942382 (Idaho Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2019). McNeil petitioned for Idaho Supreme Court review. See
McNeil v. State, No. 45766 (filed Oct. 18, 2019).
While McNeil’s petition for review was pending, the state district court denied his Rule
60(b) motion. (R, pp.38-40.) It found that McNeil’s motion was not filed within a reasonable time

1

In this brief, “R.” refers to the limited clerk’s record prepared for the appeal in this case. “45766
R.” refers to the clerk’s record prepared for McNeil’s prior post-conviction appeal.
2

as required by the rules. (R., p.39.) That was because “[t]he reasons stated in the motion and
declaration were all known” to McNeil “immediately after” the district court “entered its Order
dismissing” the second amended petition; as such, it was “not reasonable’ for McNeil “to wait
over a year to file this motion based on the perceived ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel.”
(Id.)
The district court next found, in the alternative, that the Rule 60(b) motion failed on the
merits, insofar as McNeil “failed to come forward alleging any facts which demonstrate[d] ‘unique
and compelling circumstances’ necessary to justify relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6).” (R., p.40.)
The court accordingly denied McNeil’s motion for relief from the post-conviction judgment. (Id.)
McNeil timely appealed from the district court’s order denying his Rule 60(b) motion. (R,
pp.42-45.) 2

2

Several days after McNeil filed his notice of appeal from the Rule 60(b) denial, the Idaho
Supreme Court denied McNeil’s petition for review in the original post-conviction appeal. See
See McNeil v. State, No. 45766, Order Denying Petition for Review (filed Feb. 20, 2020).
3

ISSUE
McNeil states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. McNeil’s Rule
60(b)(6) motion?
(Appellant’s brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has McNeil failed to show the district court abused its discretion by denying his untimely,
meritless Rule 60(b) motion?

4

ARGUMENT
McNeil Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying His
Untimely, Meritless Rule 60(b) Motion
A.

Introduction
The district court denied McNeil’s motion because it was untimely and, alternatively,

meritless. (R., pp.39-40.) On appeal, McNeil argues “the district court did not exercise reason
when it ruled he did not file” his Rule 60(b) motion “within a reasonable time,” and “did not
exercise reason when it determined his motion did not present unique and compelling
circumstances to justify relief.” (Appellant’s brief, p.5.)
These arguments fail. Despite being fully aware of the basis of his Rule 60(b) motion when
the post-conviction case was dismissed, McNeil waited nearly 13 months after the entry of
judgment to file his motion. (Compare 45766 R., p.384 with R., p.9.) This was an unreasonable
delay. Even assuming the motion was timely, the district court correctly determined it was
meritless, insofar as McNeil failed to show he was denied meaningful representation by postconviction counsel. The court properly exercised its discretion when it denied the Rule 60(b)
motion.

B.

Standard Of Review
A trial court’s decision whether to grant relief pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b) is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. The decision will be upheld if it appears that the
trial court (1) correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, (2) acted within the
boundaries of its discretion and consistent with the applicable legal standards, and
(3) reached its determination through an exercise of reason.

Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 734, 228 P.3d 998, 1001 (2010) (quoting Waller v. State, Dep’t of
Health and Welfare, 146 Idaho 234, 237-38, 192 P.3d 1058, 1061-62 (2008) (internal citations
omitted)).

5

C.

The District Court Properly Denied McNeil’s Rule 60(b) Motion Because It Was Not Filed
Within A Reasonable Time
Rule 60(b) provides a means for an aggrieved party to obtain relief from a “‘final judgment,

order, or proceeding’ directly from the trial court without resorting to an appeal.” Ross v. State,
141 Idaho 670, 672, 115 P.3d 761, 763 (Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Hoopes v. Bagley, 117 Idaho
1091, 793 P.2d 1263 (Ct. App. 1990)). The rule specifies a number of grounds upon which relief
may be granted, including: (1) “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect”; (2) “newly
discovered evidence …”; (3) “fraud …, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party”;
(4) a void judgment; (5) a satisfied judgment; or (6) “any other reason justifying relief.” I.R.C.P.
60(b); Ross, 141 Idaho at 672, 115 P.3d at 763. There is no express time limitation for filing a
motion for relief from judgment on the grounds set forth in I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4)-(6); however, such
motion must “be made within a reasonable time.” I.R.C.P. 60(c)(1). In addition, to be entitled to
Rule 60(b) relief, the party seeking relief must “show, plead or present evidence of facts which, if
established, would constitute a meritorious defense to the action.” Ponderosa Paint Mfg., Inc. v.
Yack, 125 Idaho 310, 317, 870 P.2d 663, 670 (Ct. App. 1994). Although Idaho’s appellate courts
do not appear to have determined what constitutes a “reasonable time” for bringing a Rule 60(b)(6)
motion, the Idaho Supreme Court has held, in the context of deciding the timeliness of postconviction claims, that a “reasonable time” is measured from the date the petitioner discovered the
factual basis of the claim being asserted. See, e.g., Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 251, 220 P.3d
1066, 1070 (2009).
Applying that standard here, there is no question that McNeil did not file his Rule 60(b)
motion within a reasonable time. McNeil’s post-conviction judgment was entered on January 30,
2018. (45766 R., p.384.) The district court correctly found that the basis of McNeil’s Rule 60(b)
motion was known to him “immediately after” that. (R., p.39.) McNeil’s motion alleged that,

6

“from the get,” his post-conviction attorney did not give “meaningful representation.” (R., p.10.)
Since 2015, McNeil noted, he had “complained” to the court “that his appointed counsel had
submitted only a cursory” petition for post-conviction relief, “in lieu of a thoroughly reviewed,
developed, investigated, and duly amended petition”; and that, “[f]or years” he “exhorted the court
to dismiss post-conviction counsel and assign a more capable lawyer.” (R., pp.10, 15.) All of
McNeil’s complaints focused on post-conviction counsel’s actions during the post-conviction
case, which necessarily preceded the final judgment dismissing it. (See R., pp.10-15.) Yet McNeil
waited nearly 13 months after the judgment issued—until February 2019—to file his Rule 60(b)
motion. (45766 R., p.384; R., p.12.) Because McNeil knew the basis for his Rule 60(b) motion
on the day his post-conviction case was dismissed, he fails to show that waiting over a year to file
this motion was reasonable.
On appeal, McNeil does not dispute the district court’s factual finding that he knew the
basis of the Rule 60(b) motion “immediately after” judgment was entered. (See Appellant’s brief.)
Nevertheless, he argues that “filing the motion one year and twenty days after the judgment was
reasonable when compared to the one year and forty-two day limit to file an initial petition for
post-conviction relief.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.8-9.) This is an arbitrary comparison and an
unsupported standard; he cites no court that has used it. (See id.) And while McNeil claims this
year-plus metric “promotes judicial economy” because a “Rule 60(b)(6) motion could be rendered
moot by a favorable outcome on appeal” (Appellant’s brief, p.9), this logic cuts both ways. A
post-conviction appeal could just as easily be mooted by a favorable Rule 60(b) decision, but this
does not mean it would be reasonable, or economic, to delay filing a petition while such a motion
pends.

7

In any event, McNeil’s proposed standard does not promote judicial economy. It embraces
unreasonable delay. Judicial economy would not be served by encouraging parties to wait until
their appeals are nearly over to file Rule 60(b) motions challenging the judgment. That is
particularly true here, where McNeil’s post-conviction appeal (pressing ineffective assistance
claims) overlaps in significant respects with this Rule 60(b) appeal (raising purported failures to
raise ineffective assistance claims) (R., pp.14-15, 28-37). Had McNeil filed his Rule 60(b) motion
when he first knew of his claims, this appeal could have easily been consolidated with the original
post-conviction appeal. Instead, because McNeil delayed filing his motion (for reasons he never
articulates), we have two post-conviction appeals instead of one—covering much of the same
factual, procedural, and argumentative territory.
Because McNeil’s Rule 60(b) claims were well known to him at the time judgment was
entered, it was unreasonable for McNeil to wait over a year to raise them. The district court
correctly denied his motion as untimely. (R., p.39.)

D.

Alternatively, McNeil’s Rule 60(b) Motion Was Properly Denied Because It Was Meritless
Even if this Court reaches the merits 3 of McNeil’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion, it fails. The

district court correctly found, “[e]ven if [McNeil’s motion] had been timely filed,” that McNeil
had “not come forward with any evidence … to justify relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6).” (R.,
p.40.) This was so because, “[a]lthough the district court has broad discretion in deciding a Rule

3

Another potential pre-merits issue is whether the district court should have considered McNeil’s
pro se Rule 60(b) motion at all. McNeil preemptively flags the decision in Ward v. State, 166
Idaho 330, ___, 458 P.3d 199, 203 (2020), which held a district court erred by even “entertain[ing]
the” pro se “filings made by Ward,” who was represented by post-conviction counsel. McNeil
argues that holding shouldn’t apply in this context, and that district courts may consider pro se
Rule 60(b) motions filed by represented parties. This issue was not raised by either party below
nor considered by the district court. (See generally R.) Thus, the state takes no position on it, and
assumes arguendo that the district court properly heard McNeil’s motion.
8

60(b) motion, the motion may be granted only upon a showing of unique and compelling
circumstances.” Palmer v. Spain, 138 Idaho 798, 802, 69 P.3d 1059, 1063 (2003) (citing Miller v.
Haller, 129 Idaho 345, 348, 924 P.2d 607, 610 (1996)).
Such circumstances existed in Eby, 148 Idaho at 732-738, 228 P.3d at 999-1005, where the
Idaho Supreme Court held that, in “rare instances,” relief from judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P.
60(b)(6) may be available based upon an attorney’s abandonment of his client in a post-conviction
proceeding, where the record reflects a “complete absence of meaningful representation.” The
district court dismissed Eby’s petition for inactivity after none of Eby’s appointed post-conviction
attorneys filed an amended petition or any other substantive filings over the course of several years.
Eby, 148 Idaho at 732-733, 228 P.3d at 999-1000. The court then denied Eby’s I.R.C.P. 60(b)
motion for relief from judgment. Id. at 734, 228 P.3d at 1001. The Idaho Supreme Court remanded
the case after concluding that I.R.CP. 60(b)(6) relief may have been available to Eby under the
circumstances of that case. Id. at 736-738, 228 P.3d at 1003-1005. The Court reiterated that there
is no right to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, but that given the unique status of
a post-conviction proceeding, the “complete absence of meaningful representation” may present
the “unique and compelling circumstances” in which I.R.C.P. 60(b) relief may be warranted. Id.
Likewise, in Andrus v. State, 164 Idaho 565, 566-67, 433 P.3d 665, 666-67 (Ct. App.
2019), Andrus’ post-conviction counsel filed no motions, documents, amendments, or pleadings
in Andrus’ case, aside from a motion for extension of time to file an amended petition. The district
court summarily dismissed Andrus’ petition on the record before it. Id. The district court then
denied Andrus’ subsequent I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) motion on the ground that, unlike in Eby, Andrus’
post-conviction petition was dismissed on its merits, on the record before the district court. Id. at
569, 433 P.3d at 669. Further, the court concluded that Andrus failed to show that there were any
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theoretical amendments to the petition or additional facts or arguments that would have prevented
summary dismissal. Id.
The Court of Appeals reversed the denial order. Id. at 567-70, 433 P.3d at 667-70. The
Court reasoned that because a post-conviction petitioner has a statutory right to the appointment
of counsel when he has raised the possibility of a valid claim, a district court does not actually
address the merits of such claims unless the petitioner had some assistance from appointed counsel
in developing or presenting his claims. Id. at 569-80, 433 P.3d at 669-80. Further, the Court held
that Andrus was not required to show that any attorney assistance would have prevented summary
dismissal. Id. at 570, 433 P.3d at 670. The Court also cautioned that while a petitioner does not
need to establish “years of shocking or disgraceful neglect” as occurred in Eby to avail himself of
I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) relief, such relief should not become “the rule instead of the exception,” or
become available where counsel “performs some duties such that the claims have been reviewed
or counsel participates by pleading or appearance.” Id. at 569, 433 P.3d at 669.
This case is nothing like Eby or Andrus. McNeil cannot show the “unique and compelling
circumstances” of a “complete absence of meaningful representation,” or that the record otherwise
“reveals counsel has not meaningfully participated in the proceedings. Eby, 148 Idaho at 732-738,
228 P.3d at 999-1005; Andrus, 164 Idaho at 570, 433 P.3d at 670. And the post-conviction record
was not “devoid of pleadings,” as McNeil falsely claimed—it shows counsel was fully engaged in
and meaningfully participated in the proceedings. Among other things, post-conviction counsel
filed two amended petitions for post-conviction relief (R., pp.77-86, 169-88), responded to the
state’s motion for summary disposition (R., pp.253-61), objected to the state’s discovery motion
(R., pp.283-285), responded to the court’s notice of intent to dismiss (R., pp.328-38), apparently
hired “an experienced private investigator” to meet with McNeil (see 45766 Tr., p.14, Ls.12-19),
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and appeared before the district court (see 45766 Tr.). Thus, the district court correctly found this
case was nothing like Eby, and that McNeil failed to show entitlement to relief. (R., p.40.)
McNeil offers little to counter this on appeal. He “acknowledges his counsel participated
in pleadings and appearances,” but nevertheless “maintains his counsel failed to provide
‘meaningful’ representation” on the 12 ineffective assistance claims cited in his motion.
(Appellant’s brief, p.10 (citing R., pp.14-15).) Parroting his arguments below, he claims that postconviction “counsel ‘disregarded’ or ‘neglected to consult’” with McNeil on those 12 claims.
(Appellant’s brief, p.9 (quoting R., p.14).)
What McNeil fails to mention is that these 12 claims were not actually “disregarded” by
post-conviction counsel at all. In fact, every single one of these 12 claims was raised by postconviction counsel, as follows:
•

Claim (a), regarding “Exhibit 95” (R., p.14), was raised in the second amended petition
(45766 R., pp.171-75), the response to the state’s motion for summary disposition
(45766 R., pp.253-54), and the response to the court’s notice of intent to dismiss (45766
R., pp.328-31);

•

Claim (b), regarding calling “[a]n expert witness in fire reconstruction” (R., p.14), was
raised in the second amended petition (45766 R., pp.175-77), the response to the state’s
motion for summary disposition (45766 R., pp.254-55), and the response to the court’s
notice of intent to dismiss (45766 R., pp.331-32);

•

Claim (c), alleging trial counsel “failed to object to exhibit 295” (R., p.14), was raised
in the second amended petition (45766 R., pp.178), the response to the state’s motion
for summary disposition (45766 R., p.255), and the response to the court’s notice of
intent to dismiss (45766 R., pp.332-33);
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•

Claim (d), alleging trial counsel “failed to object to exhibit 10 [sic][4]” (R., p.14), was
raised in the second amended petition (45766 R., pp.178-79), the response to the state’s
motion for summary disposition (45766 R., pp.255-56), and the response to the court’s
notice of intent to dismiss (45766 R., pp.332-33);

•

Claim (e), alleging trial counsel “failed to object to exhibit 3” (R., p.14), was raised in
the second amended petition (45766 R., pp.179-80), the response to the state’s motion
for summary disposition (45766 R., p.256), and the response to the court’s notice of
intent to dismiss (45766 R., pp.333);

•

Claim (f), alleging trial counsel “failed to cross examine Mariesa Hansen” (R., p.14),
was raised in the second amended petition (45766 R., p.181), the response to the state’s
motion for summary disposition (45766 R., pp.256-57), and the response to the court’s
notice of intent to dismiss (45766 R., p.334);

•

Claim (g), alleging trial counsel “failed to call Joe Riso” (R., p.14), was raised in the
second amended petition (45766 R., pp.181-82), the response to the state’s motion for
summary disposition (45766 R., p.257), and the response to the court’s notice of intent
to dismiss (45766 R., pp.334);

•

Claim (h), alleging trial counsel “failed to move for DNA testing” (R., p.15), was raised
in the second amended petition (45766 R., pp.183-84), the response to the state’s
motion for summary disposition (45766 R., pp.257-58), and the response to the court’s
notice of intent to dismiss (45766 R., pp.335-36);

4

“Exhibit 10” here appears to be a typographical error, as McNeil’s original petition made clear
he faulted trial counsel for not objecting to Exhibit 110. (45766 R., p.11.)
12

•

Claim (i), alleging trial counsel “failed to recall Dr. Garrison” (R., p.15), was raised in
the second amended petition (45766, p.184);

•

Claim (j), alleging trial counsel “coerced me to waive my right to a speedy trial” (R.,
p.15), was raised in the second amended petition (45766, pp.184-85), and the response
to the state’s motion for summary disposition (45766 R., p.258);

•

Claim (k), alleging trial counsel “abandoned me during critical-stage plea negotiations”
(R., p.15), was raised in the second amended petition (45766, pp.185-86), the response
to the state’s motion for summary disposition (45766 R., pp.258-60);

•

and Claim (l), alleging trial counsel “neglected to call a pathologist during the
sentencing hearing” (R., p.15), was raised in the second amended petition (45766 R.,
pp.180-81), the response to the state’s motion for summary disposition (45766 R.,
p.256), and the response to the court’s notice of intent to dismiss (45766 R., pp.33334).

McNeil similarly ignores that some of these 12 claims were addressed yet again by postconviction counsel in his May, 2017 notice of Supplemental Points & Authorities. (45766 R.,
pp.294-302.) That filing made clear that post-conviction counsel was fully aware that McNeil had
requested certain issues be raised, and so counsel was again bringing them to the court.
Lloyd Hardin McNeil, Petitioner, respectfully requests that this Court consider this
supplemental brief in support of his Second Amended Petition and in response to
the State’s Motion for Summary Dismissal. Counsel filed a brief in response to the
State’s Motion over a year ago, on February 5, 2016, and since that time Mr.
McNeil has submitted several filings pro se. Counsel submits this supplement to
assist the Court in deciding whether to hold an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s
allegations, considering that more than fourteen months have elapsed since
counsel’s last brief and that Mr. McNeil desires to provide the Court with additional
information.
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(45766 R., p.294.) Counsel’s supplemental brief went on to re-argue Claim (a), regarding Exhibit
95, Claim (b), regarding Exhibit 295, and Claim (c), regarding Exhibit 110, among other things.
(See
- - 45766 R., pp.295-301.)
Finally, McNeil does not acknowledge post-conviction counsel’s statements to the district
court, which show he was well aware that McNeil may have wanted him to raise some claims in a
different manner. But post-conviction counsel was constrained by ethical rules, and tried to litigate
McNeil’s claims within those boundaries as best he could:
MR. DEFRANCO: So my personal relationship with my client has been fine.
I suppose to the extent that there’s a tension in the case, the tension is that
Mr. McNeil has explained to me that there’s an innocent man in prison right now,
serving time for alleged crimes that he didn't commit. And there was evidence that
was available for the Ada County Public Defender at the trial phase to present that
would have exonerated him, and a lot of that evidence was just simply ignored.
Now, frankly, in my opinion, the good evidence that exists is in the petition.
And to be quite frank, I feel like I came up pretty close to the line in terms of what
I could ethically allege in the petition. And in many ways, that was a compromise
with my client. I perceived that the Court’s expectation is that there’s going to be
an amended petition filed, when there was once a pro se petition; and for anything
else, that it’s typewritten and in the concept that’s trying to be impressed upon the
Court is digestible and in a format that the Court is accustomed to reading.
And that goes the same for counsel on the other side. The respondents have
to be able to digest the gist of the petition and respond accordingly.
So I understand his first and foremost claim is that some of these allegations
may be subject to summary dismissal by virtue of the fact that the second element
of Strickland isn’t in play, i.e., prejudice. But, nevertheless, I mean, in some of those
things, it’s difficult to quantify exactly what the prejudice would be, what would
have been different but for that information having been presented.
(45766 Tr., p.14, L.20 – p.16, L.6 (emphasis added).) To the extent McNeil’s counsel did not
press McNeil’s claims in the exact way McNeil demanded, because he ethically could not, that
was entirely proper.
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Thus, McNeil fails to show that post-conviction counsel “disregarded” these 12 postconviction claims at all. To the contrary, counsel raised every single one of these claims below,
in well-sourced pleadings, supplementary points and authorities, and specific responses to the
district court and the state. This was meaningful, active post-conviction representation, and is
nowhere near the “unique and compelling” circumstances justifying Rule 60(b) relief, such as
those found in Eby and Andrus. McNeil therefore fails to show the district court abused its
discretion by denying McNeil’s motion on the merits.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the denial of McNeil’s untimely, meritless
Rule 60(b) motion.
DATED this 21st day of January, 2021.

/s/ Kale D. Gans
KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
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